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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1952-53 TERM
"Doing Business" within the State
The test to determine whether a foreign corporation is "doing business" -within the state to such an extent as to be amenable
to process, is that the corporation be "here with a fair measure
of permanence and continuity."' This test, formulated by Cardozo and derived from the United States Supreme Court,6 has been
followed by the Court of Appeals. 7
In Elish v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co.,' the Court of Appeals again applied this test. A Missouri corporation, although
not qualified to do business within the state, had an office in New
York City and Buffalo to solicit freight. It also maintained a
separate New York City office, listed as one of the corporation's
three general offices, which conducted fiscal business and was the
location for one of the corporation's four annual board of director's meetings. The corporation argued that its only business
within the state was solicitation, which alone is insufficient for the
New York courts to acquire jurisdiction.9 The court held, however, that solicitation plus other business activities conducted in
this state renders the corporation "here" and therefore amenable
to process.
Construction of Complaint
Under Civil Practice Act § 275, pleadings must be liberally
construed. If the defendant moves under Civil Practice Rule 106
to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it is legally insufficient, the complaint will not be dismissed if in any aspect of the
facts stated, the plaintiff is entitled to recovery. Every inference
is in favor of the pleading.10
In the recent case of Curren v. O'Connor," these principles
of law were applied by the court. Plaintiffs, social guests of
defendants, brought an action for personal injuries and loss of
services, charging the defendants with negligence. Defendants
moved under Rule 106 to dismiss the complaint, challenging its
legal sufficiency. The Appellate Division, reversing Special Term,
granted the motion because the plaintiffs, as social guests of the
defendants could not recover.
5. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 268, 115 N. E. 915, 918 (1917).
6. InternationalHarvester v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914).
7. Chaplin v. Selznick, 293 N. Y. 529, 58 N. E. 2d 719 (1944.) ; Sterling Vcv Lty
Corp. v. Frank & Hirsch Distributing Co., 299 N. Y. 208, 86 N. E. 2d 564 (1949).
8. 305 N. Y. 267, 112 N. E. 2d 842 (1953).
9.Yeckes-Eichebawn, Inc. v.McCarthy, 290 N. Y. 437, 49 N. E. 2d 517 (1943).
10. Dyer v.Broadway Central Bank, 252 N. Y. 430, 16Q N. E. 635 (1930);
Potnerance v.Poanerance, 301 N. Y. 254, 93 N. E. 2d 832 (1950).
11. 304 N. Y. 515, 109 N. E. 2d 605 (1952).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the Appellate
Division, stating the court's liberal view toward the sufficiency
of complaints, particularly in negligence actions, in at least permitting the parties to go to trial where the plaintiffs, under other
allegations in the complaint, may be able to submit evidence
entitling them to recover, 12 and no bill of particulars is involved.
Couterclaim in Suit by Partnership
Action was brought by a partnership composed of two general
and two limited partners against its former attorney, who had
been discharged for cause. Defendant attorney set up a counterclaim against one general and one limited partner, as individuals,
for damages resulting from their conspiracy to destroy his professional standing. The counterclaim was held improper because
under C. P. A. § 266
the claim and counterclaim must be between
13
the same parties.
The interesting aspect of the case is the statement of the court
that for the purposes of pleading, the partnership is to be regarded
as a legal entity. 14 The court strengthens its position by referring
to 0. P. A. § 222-a (two or more persons carrying on business as
partners may sue- or be sued in their partnership name), and the
commentary of the Judicial Council in proposing the enactment of
this section, which stated that the old common law concept of the
partnership as simply a group of individuals, for purposes of
pleading, is undesirable."3
Although C. P. A. § 266 liberalized the practice relating to
counterclaims, defining a counterclaim as any cause of action in
favor of the defendants against the plaintiffs, or some of them, the
section did not change the rule that the counterclaim must be by
and against the same party in the same capacity.'6
The court, in the instant case, combines the above two tenets
to conclude that the partnership sues as an entity and the counterclaim must be against that entity, not the individual partners. It
would seem that the court, by its reasoning, has deftly evaded the
plain meaning of C. P. A. § 266.
12. Higgins v. Mason, 255 N. Y. 104, 174 N. E. 77 (1930); Faber v. Meiler, 278
App. Div. 849, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 485 (2d Dep't 1951).
13. Ruzicka v. Roger, 305 N. Y. 191, 111 N. E. 2d 878 (1953).
14. Id. at 197. 111 N. E. 2d 881.
15. Eleventh Annual Report of N. Y. Judicial Council, pp. 221, 224-225 (1945).
16. U. S. Trust Co. of .N. Y. v. Stanton, 139 N. Y. 531, 34 N. E. 1098 (1893);
Binon v. Boel, 297 N. Y. 528, 74 N. E. 2d 466 (1947) ; Select Theatres Corp. v. Haris,
Inc., 273 App. Div. 505, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 159 (1st Dep't 1948).
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